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ABSTRACT 
The use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the net welfare 
payoffs from water projects has now been an established practice for 
many years. One of the interesting aspects of such cost-benefit 
studies is that water projects involve an uncertain flow of costs and 
benefits, arising from the stochastic nature of streamflows. Hence a 
basic problem for the cost-benefit analyst is that of incorporating 
this uncertainty into his measures of costs and benefits. In the 
present paper, we examine the problem of computing an appropriate 
consumer surplus measure to evaluate water project benefits under 
uncertainty. Detailed treatment is given to the case in which a 
complete set of contingent claim markets exist in the economy, as well 
as to the case of a spot market economy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the net welfare 
payoffs from water projects has now been an established practice for 
many years. One of the interesting aspects of such cost-benefit 
studies is that water projects involve an uncertain flow of costs and 
benefits, arising from the stochastic nature of streamflows. Hence a 
basic problem for the cost-benefit analyst is that of incorporating 
this uncertainty into his measures of costs and benefits. In the 
present paper, we examine the problem of computing an appropriate 
consumer surplus measure to evaluate water project benefits under 
uncertainty. Detailed treatment is given to the case in which a 
complete set of contingent claim markets exist in the economy, as well 
as to the case of a spot market economy. Generally speaking, the spot 
market economy model appears to be a closer approximation to reality 
than the complete contingent claim market model. One of the 
interesting aspects of the spot market model is that there is an 
unobserved component of consumer benefits in a spot market economy 
that limits the applicability of the usual consumer surplus measure. 
2. A CONTINGENT CLAIM WATER ECONOMY 
To keep the notational clutter to a minimum, we consider the 
case of a world in which there are two consumer goods, y and z, where 
y denotes the consumption of water and z is a non-water good (say, a 
composite commodity) which does not involve the use of water as an 
intermediate product or input in production. The only uncertainty in 
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the first model we consider is uncertainty as to streamflows. Let njt 
denote the probability of streamflow j in period t. There are assumed 
to be J possible streamflow levels in each period, and T periQds. We 
take the probability distribution over streamflows to be "objective, " 
since historical streamflows are tabled for most major rivers and 
their tributaries; and we assume that water users are aware of these 
data and make use of them in their decision making. Again, mainly for 
notational convenience, we take the probability distribution over 
streamflows to be stationary with respect to time, and intertemporal 
independence is assumed as well. Thus the joint probability of the 
sequence of streamflows (xj .xj , . . . • xj ) is given by nj .nj . ···nj . 1 2 t 1 2 t 
As a matter of notation, let 
x(jl � jt) = (xjl • ... ,xjt
). 
We first examine the cost-benefit problem in the context of an 
Arrow-Debrew [1] type world in which there is a complete set of 
contingent claim markets all of which open at time O. Consumers make 
binding commitments to consumption over the T-period horizon through 
purchases and sales of contingent claims to the goods y and z at time 
O; all market transactions occur in the period 0 contingent claim 
markets. Randomness enters the picture because of stochastic 
streamflows; there is no randomness emanating from the consumption 
side, or from the supply side with respect to commodity z. 
i Let Yj ···j denote the number of contingent claim contracts1 t 
acquired by consumer i, satisfying the property that each claim pays 
one unit of good y in period t if the streamflow sequence xCJ1 � jt) 
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occurs. Similarly, let pj • • •  j denote the price of such a contingent1 t 
claim contract. zi jl j 
is the number of contingent claims to z
t 
acquired by i, satisfying the property that each claim pays one unit 
of good z in period t if the streamflow xCj1 � jt) occurs, with
qj ···j being the price of such a contract. Sellers of these1 t 
contracts are the firms producing goods y and z. Note also that if 
the streamflow sequence x(j1 � jt) occurs, then consumption by
consumer i in period t is the vector (y� ···j ,z� ···j ), because ofJl t 1 t 
the absence of spot markets in the periods following period O; that 
is, purchases of contingent claim contracts are binding commitments to 
consumption. 
To simplify notation, let nt denote the index set over 
streamflows xCJ1 � jt) commencing at time 1 and terminating at time
T 
t. Let n = U nt denote the set of all index sets over streamflow t=l 
sequences, ranging from one to T-period sequences. Then nt is also 
the index set over consumptions in period t, and over prices (p, q) of 
contingent claim contracts to tth period consumption. 
Given the usual separability assumptions concerning 
preferences, the decision problem for consumer i reduces to the 
following: 
max 
(yi, zi) 
subject to 
wicn 
EUi 
T t i i i 
[ Pi) nrut(yr,zr)t=l rint 
T 
[ ot ) CM; 
t=l r�t 
i i 
PrYr - qrzr) 0 
4 
(1) 
where (yi,zi) is the matrix of contingent claim purchases by consumer 
i, Pi is consumer i's personal discount rate, o = <1 ; i) where i is 
the market rate of interest, Mi is income for consumer i, and wi(T) is 
consumer i's wealth at time T. In this formulation, we assume a 
perfect capital market with a T-period horizon. 
This gives rise to the usual first order conditions, assuming 
a regular interior maximum, that is, 
am: � - A. = 0 
a� ayi r r
� OCm - A. = 0 
azi azi r r
Wi(T) = 0 
Given the structure of markets outlined above, we are 
interested in constructing a measure, in the form of consumers' 
surplus, of the benefits associated with controlling a river. In 
(2) 
s 
particular, we are interested in a measure of the benefits from a 
change from a completely uncontrolled river to one with a dam-
reservoir complex controlling flows, with a reservoir storage capacity 
• • 
of S acre-feet of water, where S is some given constant. To finesse 
the well known aggregation problems plaguing consumers' surplus, we 
will instead calculate consumer's surplus for one individual, say 
consumer i. Then the relevant measure of benefits for the consumer is 
presumably the amount of discounted income that consumer i is willing 
to give up to be indifferent between facing a controlled river with s• 
units of storage capacity, and facing an ucontrolled river. Thus we 
are dealing with the compensated demand curve(s) for yi, along which 
EUi is a constant. In the usual partial equilibrium approach, we
assume that the prices q(") of the non-water commodity z are 
unaffected by changes in the water storage capacity levels. 
To simply the notation, we will drop the sub (super) script 
identifying the individual where there is no problem of ambiguity. 
Let DPV denote the discounted present value of income for consumer i. 
Then DPV is given by 
T 
DPV L &t [ Ms. ( 3)  
t=l se!lt
Since W(T) = 0 is a binding constraint that holds for all 
values of S, then, given a change dS in the reservoir storage level, 
dW(T) = 0. Thus we have from (1) and (3):
dDPV <-> \ [aw<Tl + \ (aw<T> ays + fill.ill_ azs> ] L ap L0 ay ap az ap rell r se. s r s r 
dp 
( d;)dS (4) 
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Along a compensated demand curve, dEU=O, thus 
dEU = [ [ [ aEU ays + aEU azs l dpr ay ap az ap <�ldS 0 ( S) 
reD seO s r s r 
By the first order conditions (2),
a EU 
ays 
).� � ays • azs 
A.aWCT) 
az s 
Given non-satiation, A. > 0, and thus (4) reduces to 
dDPV
dp _ [ <aw<T» <__:_r_> ds apr dS raO 
t 
t dpr L & [ yr(�ldS
t=l rant
(6) 
(7) 
Thus the consumer surplus measure relevant for the comparison 
between an uncontrolled river and one with a reservoir capacity of s• 
units is given by 
cs 
T 
(-) [ 
t=l 
• dp 
&t [ J� yr( d;)dS 
reDt 
In the special case where yr depends on.ly on pr and where S 
( 8) 
affects only one price Pr• then by a change of variables we end up 
with the usual consumer's surplus area computed from the compensated 
demand curve for Yr• but clearly this is a case with no practical
significance for the evaluation of the typical water project. In any 
case, it is clear that the consumer's surplus measure calculated in 
(8) is of precisely the same form as the corresponding consumer's 
surplus measure for the certainty case. The major difference is that 
the contingent claim version incorporates the alternative possible 
streamflows indexed by the set n. As Rogerson (2) has noted in a 
different context, this correspondence reflects in part at least the 
fact that uncertainty is assumed to enter the picture in our model 
only from the supply side of the market. 
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Turning to the supply side of the market, assume that a public 
agency is charged with the task of operating the dam-reservoir 
complex, using the rule of maximizing expected profits taking prices 
(of contingent claims) as parameters. In analyzing the decision 
making process of the agency, timing of inflows and releases is of 
importance. We assume that in any period, inflows and releases occur 
at the end of the period, just before the reservoir level is measured. 
The tth period begins at time t-1 and ends at time t. 
Let Sj • • •  j be the amount of water stored in the reservoir at1 t 
time t, given the sequence of streamflows xCj1 -7 jt) and given an
optimal (expected profit maximizing) release policy. 
• 
Yj • • · is the1 jt 
optimal level of releases in period t, given the streamflow sequence 
x( jl -7 jt), and RJ. 
• • • 
. is the amount of water available for release
1 Jt 
in the tth period, being measured near the end of that period, after 
inflows are known but before releases have occurred. 
s r 
Then we have the following accounting identities: 
(1 - a)S + xj s t
• 
Yr• s e "t-l'r (s,jt) ( 9) 
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where a is the percentage loss in reservoir stocks due to evaporation; 
Rr 
so that 
Rr 
(1 - a)Ss + xj , s E "t-l' r t 
(s,jt)
• 
(1 - a)[Rs - ys] + xj , s E "t-l' rt 
(10) 
(s, jt). (11) 
The dam-reservoir operator then chooses a sequence of releases 
to maximize expected profits. Let r 
= 
Cj1,• • •  ,jt) E "t· and let 
x(r) = xCj1 -7 jt). Then at time t, when the streamflow sequence x(r)
• 
is already known to have occurred, the operator chooses the release yr
to maximize V(Rr)• where 
VCRr) 
J 
max 
• t+l [ IT j 
* 
Ii tPrY r + Ii jt+l =1 t+l 0.{Rs -y s�s
*
> + x ]V [(l - a)(Rr - Yr jt+l 
(12) 
with s =  (r,jt+l> E nt+l'
V(Rr) is to be maximized subject to the constraint 
• • 
O .{ Rr - Yr .{ S (13) 
Thus at time T, with Rw acre-feet of water available for
T • release Cw = Cj1, • . .  ,jT) e OT)' Yw is chosen to max Ii PwYw subject to
• 0 .{ Rw - Yw .{ S • 
Given the linear increasing objective function together with 
the linear constraints, clearly the optimal policy involves setting 
• - R Yw - w· 
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At T-1. with Rv acre-feet of water available (v
• (j1,• . • • jT-l) e DT_1),yv is chosen to
max V(Rv) 
T-1 • T LJ • max & PvYv + & nj p [(1 - a)(R - y ) + xj ] jT=l T w v v T 
subject to O � R - y• � s•. where wv v 
Thus a� = &T-l[Pv - &(1 - a) � njTPw]a� jT� 
(v. jT) e DT.
The term inside the square brackets is the difference between 
the value at time T-1 of a unit of water released at T-1. and the 
discounted expected value at time T-1 of a unit of water stored at 
time T-1 for release at time T. The "own interest rate" y = __g__ is1 - a 
included as a discount factor. with &(1 - a) = <1 � i> <1 � Y). 
When the term inside the square brackets is positive, the 
• optimal release Yv = Rv• the stock of water available. When the term
is negative. y• = max (O,R - s•}, that is. as much water as possiblev v 
is stored. When the term inside the square brackets is zero, then any 
feasible release is optimal. 
In the general case of an arbitrary index t and streamflow 
sequence indexed by r E Dt, the relevant criterion for the dam­
reservoir operator is the expression 
[•, - maxs J [ jt+l =1 J [. -1 Jt+s- s &s(l - a) n jt+l ... nj Pw ]t+s s (14) 
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where s = 1 • • .
.
 
T - t and ws = (r,jt+l•···•jt+s> e Dt+s·
If the expression (14) is positive, then it pays (in 
discounted expected profit terms) to release as much water as possible 
at time t; if it is negative. then there is a time in the future such 
that water released at that time has a higher discounted expected 
value today than water released today. so as much water as possible 
should be held in storage. If the expression is zero. any feasible 
release is optimal. 
Using (14) to regulate releases determines the supply of water 
to be made available at any point in time for any given sequence of 
streamflows and hence this determines the supply of contingent claims 
to water offered by the dam-reservoir operator as a function of the 
• set of prices P(") for contingent claims. and the storage capacity S 
Equilibrium in the market for contingent claims occurs when 
there is simultaneous clearing of all such markets, so that the price 
vector p satisfies 
• • I 1 �/s(p; q) ys(p,S ) for s e D.
Hence we have 
[ 
rdl
[� ay! _ ays]
L ap ap 
i=l r r 
dpr ( -� ) dS 
• ayr 
as s E D.
with all magnitudes evaluated at the equilibrium prices p. q. 
(15) 
(16) 
Solving this system of <J:l)(J�l) simultaneous equations in
the same number of variables for each value of s. 0 ( s � s• would (in 
dp 
principle!) enable us to determine the values of the terms <d;) 
appearing in the expression (8) for consumer's surplus, and hence to 
complete the formal calculation of that magnitude. We will not 
attempt that task here. It should be noted, however, that in the 
i dpr ays calculations to obtain (�), �a� is to be interpreted as a movement Pr 
along the compensated demand curve for y;. 
Under the appropriate assumptions, when total (consumer plus 
producer) surplus is maximized, then an ex ante Pareto optimum is 
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achieved, that is, it is not possible to make one consumer better off 
in terms of expected utility without making some other consumer worse 
off. This assumes, of course, that aggregation problems relative to 
consumers' surplus are successfully resolved. It should also be 
pointed out that expected utility calculations involve only the 
probabilities associated with streamflows, since this is the only 
source of randomness in our model of a water economy with a complete 
set of contingent claim markets. We next turn to the other extreme, 
an economy with no contingent claim markets, but with spot markets 
open in each period. 
3. A SPOT MARKET WATER ECONOMY 
In this section, we consider an economy with no contingent 
claim or futures markets, but instead one with a complete set of spot 
markets, opening at each of the T dates in the planning horizon. From 
the point of view of a typical consumer in this economy, there are two 
sources of uncertainty, that is, uncertainty as to streamflows at 
various dates in time, and uncertainty as to the prices that will 
prevail in future spot markets. To minimize notational clutter, we 
will assume that both kinds of uncertainty get incorporated into the 
consumer's subjective probability distribution over prices in future 
spot markets. That is, each consumer has a subjective pdf over the 
spot prices that will prevail at each point in time, which pdf 
reflects the underlying uncertainty as to stream flows and the 
behavior of other consumers. Once again we assume a two good (y,z) 
economy, with (p,q) denoting the prices of the goods. The reservoir 
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storage capacity S then shows up as a parameter of the consumer's pdf 
over prices f (P1, ••. ,pT; q1, ••. ,qT; S).
Once again we are interested in constructing a measure of the 
benefits to a consumer from the construction of a dam-reservoir 
complex with capacity s• to control streamflows. The decision problem 
for the consumer over a T-priced horizons is to choose consumption 
vectors y = (y1, . . .  ,yT) and z = (z1, . •• ,zT) to maximize 
EU 
subject to 
T tf L: p ···fUt (Yt,zt)ft (Pt•••••PT; qt, . . .  ,pT; S)dpdq t=l 
T t W(T) = �
1
(Mt - PtYt - qtzt)/(1 + i) o. 
In this formulation, the time stream of income Mi is known 
(17) 
( 18) 
with certainty, as is the (constant) one period interest rate i. We 
assume a perfect capital market and no default risk. Let 
T 
DPV = L Mt/(l+i) t1:=1 
denote the discounted present value of income, and let 
* t-1 s Mt = DPV - [ ( p y + q z ) I (1 + i) s=l s s s s 
t = 1, • • •  T 
denote the net amount of DPV available to be spent from time t on. 
Furthermore, we make the (heroic) assumption that default never 
* occurs, i.e., Mt is always positive. This avoids the problem of 
13 
(19) 
(20) 
introducing a complicated budget constraint in which consumption is at 
a subsistence level if default ever occurs. Allowing for default 
would not change the basic qualitative conclusions of our approach. 
The consumer presumably adopts a dynamic programming approach 
to solving his decision problem. We illustrate for the case of a 
two-period horizon. 
* In the case where T = 2, then at time 2, when P2• q2 and M2
are known the consumer chooses y2 and z2 to 
* maximize U2(y2.z2) subject to M2 = P2y2 + q2z2
Solving this problem, we obtain the demand functions 
Y2 
* 
Y2<P2·q2,M2)
* 
z2 = z2<P2.q2,M2l• 
(21) 
(22) 
Reverting to time 1, the consumer chooses Y1 and z1 to maximize 
EU = pul <Y1 .zl >
2Jf 
* * 
+ p U2<Y2<P2·q2•Hi>.z2<P2·Q2•Hi))f(p2,q2,Sldp2dq2
First order conditions characterizing an (unconstrained) 
maximum are given by 
a EU 
ay1 
a EU
az1
au1 2aEu2 Pay+ pay--1 1 
au1 2aEU2 Paz-+ Pa;-1 1 
0 
0 
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(23) 
(24) 
Given this framework, how much is the consumer willing to pay 
(in terms of DPV) for an increase dS in the storage capacity of the 
reservoir? Since the consumer is to be indifferent between a 
situation with a storage capacity of S and one with a storage capacity 
of S + dS, thus we have 
dEU = 0, 
where EU = EU(p1,q1,y1,z1.DPV,S). 
Hence, we have 
dEU = aEu_ + aEU_l + aEu_ + QIDl__ + m. dS + .l.filldDPV
{ dy1 dz dq1 dp1 } 
ay1 dS az1 dS aq1 ds ap1 dS as aDPV 
(25) 
0 
(26) 
From the first order conditions, �EU = aa
EU = O. By the usualY1 zl 
dq 
partial equilibrium assumption, � O. Also note that 
where 
a EU 
ap1 
2aEU2 jl - ( 
aM
• -yl >. while --9.W_ 
2aEU2 
2 
aDPV = II-�  aM* 2 
aEU2 
= ss[au2 aM* ay22 ay2 • aM2 au2 + az-2 . -. f(p2q2,S)dp2dq2.az2] a� 
Hence we obtain 
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dDPV 
dpl • 
Y1(�)dS - [(aEU/as>/<aEU2/aM2)]dS (27) 
where 
� 
_ mfm af aEU2 
as - Jo o02<Y2.z2 >as<P2.q2.Sldp2dq2 � as · 
Given a change from an uncontrolled river (S = 0) to a river 
with a dam-reservoir complex with reservoir storage capacity of s* 
units, the relevant consumer surplus measure in a spot market economy 
is given by 
cs IDPV(S s* > - DPV(S 
• dpl Oll= - J� y1(d$"ldS • aEU2/as + ss ( )dS0 • aEU2/aM2 
Two things should be noted about this measure of consumer 
surplus as contrasted to that for the case of the contingent claim 
(28) 
economy. First, only the first period compensated demand curve 
appears in the CS measure; benefits in the second period are already 
incorporated into the first period demand curve through the dynamic 
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programming algorithm. Second, the CS measure includes a term that is 
nonobservable. representing the benefits that accrue to the consumer 
from the change in S, when p1,y1 and z1 remain unchanged. A less 
variable time stream of releases increases expected utility of second 
period consumption. even when first period consumptions (and prices) 
• are unaffected. Since aEU2/as } o and aEU2/a� > 0, using the first
integral on the right in (28) to measure the benefits from the dam-
reservoir complex understates the value of such benefits. Since the 
market (compensated) demand curve does not reveal the information 
contained in the second term of (28), there is a need for 
supplementary work for the cost-benefit analyst. designed to elicit 
information as to the properties of the underlying EU function. 
The extension to the T-period case is straightforward. Define 
• 
Ht(yt,zt'Mt) by 
Ht(yt,zt,M�) = Ut(yt,zt) + jlE [ max Ht+1<Yt+l'zt+l'M;+1>]
Yt+l 'Zt+l 
where 
• Mt+l
• 
Mt - (ptyt + qtzt)/(1 + i)
t.
(29) 
Then at any time t, t = 1, . . •  ,T, the consumer chooses yt,zt to 
maximize Ht. By an inductive argument, it can be shown that this 
leads to the derivation of the demand functions 
• 
Yt = Yt<Pt•qt,Mt,S) 
zt 
• 
zt(pt,qt,Mt,S) 
t = 2, .. .,T. 
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(30) 
Hence, at time 1, the consumer chooses y1 and z1 to maximize 
EUi where EU is given by 
EUi 
T t • • flUCy1,z1> + L fl EUt(yt(pt,qt'Mt,S),zt(pt,qt,Mt'S)) f=2 
First order conditions are given by 
T taEUt aEU = fl_fil!_ + p } fl -.- = 0 ay1 ay1 lt'=-2 aMt 
T taEUt aEU = fl_fil!_ + q } fl -.- = 0 azl azl lt'=-2 aMt 
Consider now the derivation of a consumer surplus measure. 
EU = EU(y1,z1.p1,q1.DPV,S) so that under the partial equilibrium 
assumption, again we have 
where 
dDPV 
a EU 
ap1 
[ <aEU/ap1> dp1 urnu/asJ ] - (aEU/aDPV)(�) - (aEU/aDPVl dS, 
T taEUt - Y1 �fl -.-. and 
t= a Mt 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
T aEUt ..ll!l_ = } flt-.-. aopv t=i aMt 
Hence the consumer surplus measure for consumer i, for the 
evaluation of the benefits from increasing S from 0 to s• is again 
given by 
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cs IDPV(S s•) - DPV(S o> I (34) 
• dp l ss* (aEU
i/aS) dS. S i_dS + f 0 Y1 ( dS ) 0 (aEUi/aDPV) 
While the expression for aEUi/as is considerably more 
complicated in this case than in the 2-period case, still aEUi/as l o, 
so that if the area under the compensated Yi demand curve is used as a 
measure of consumer surplus, this understates the value of the 
benefits derived from the dam-reservoir project. 
On the supply side, the introduction of uncertainty as to 
future spot market prices does not raise any new conceptual problems, 
since the decision problem for the dam-reservoir operator is one of 
dynamic programming even when price uncertainty is absent. Given an 
expected income maximizing operator. the ef fect of introducing price 
uncertainty is simply that of replacing the known prices pr of
contingent claims associated with the streamflow sequence x(r), with 
the expected value Epr of the uncertain spot market price. in the 
operator's criterion function. That is, the rule for the operator is 
based on the expression 
J J 
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[•r - max s [ . • • [ &s(l - a)sn • .  ·nj Ep jt+l=l jt+s=l jt+l t+s ws l (35) 
where s = 1, . • . • T - t and ws (r,jt+1•···•jt+s> 8 0t+s·
If the term inside the brackets is positive, the operator 
should empty the reservoir at time t, releasing as much water as he 
can; if it is negative, then as much water as possible is stored; and 
if the expression is zero, any feasible release is consistent with a 
maximum of expected profits. 
Equilibrium in the spot market for water in period t, given 
that the streamflow sequence x(r) has occurred, is given by the 
condition 
r.
I i • yt(pt,qt,Mt,S)1 
• 
yr(pr,qr,S) ( 36) 
where y� is the demand for water by consumer i in period t, and yr is
releases by the dam-reservoir operator in period t, given the 
streamflow sequence x(r), re Ot. 
Once again, in principle, the system represented by (36) could 
be solved to obtain the appropriate equilibrium spot prices and in 
particular. a rational expectations equilibrium might be of interest 
to explore. 
4. EXAMPLE
To illustrate, consider the case where Ut = ytzt• t = 1, 2, 
. S + 1 2S + 3 with f(p2,q2, S ) = �· 1 � q2 � 2, 1 { p2 � ·
Then it is easy to verify that 
• • 
Hi Hi 
Y2 = -2 -, z2 = l P2 q2 
so that 
2 2 S l (DPV - p1y1 - q1z1l f f2S+3 1 ) + dp d EU = Y1z1 + II (S+l S+2 4p q 2 q2 1 1 2 2 
where 
Hence 
EU = y1z1 + K(DPV - p1y1 - qlzl) 
B � 1 (2S + 3) ln2K =4 S + 2 nS + l 
2 
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Kq1(DPV) Kp1CDPV) Thus y1 = �-� and z1 = �� are the ordinary demandP1q1 Plql 
curves, and the compensated demand function for y1,y�. with EU 
is given by 
y� 
Note that 
KDPVpl + ��2piDPV2 - (KDPV2 -
4Kpi + P1/q1
• 2 
2S + 3 ilEU2 (M2) _JJJLn_ [1n s+1 --as- = 4 (S + 2)2 
ilEU2 2EU2while -- = -- > o. • • ilM M 
- 2 I ID) ( 4Kp1 + P1 ql)
. - - _l _ --] > 0 
ro. 
21 
5. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS 
We have examined the construction of consumer surplus measures 
appropriate to the evaluation of a water project in two different 
economic environments--an economy containing a complete set of 
contingent claim markets (and with no spot markets); and an economy 
with a complete set of spot markets (but no contingent claim markets). 
In the Arrow-Debreu type world, the consumer surplus measure that 
applies under uncertainty as to streamflows is of the same form as the 
measure that would apply under certainty, being the sum of the 
discounted consumer surplus areas for each period over the horizon. 
The only difference between the certainty and uncertainty cases is 
that under uncertainty there is a consumer surplus area for each 
possible state of the world (sequence of streamflows) for each period. 
Things are quite different in the case of a spot market 
economy. In the first place, only the consumer surplus area for first 
period compensated demand appears in the consumer surplus measure; the 
dynamic programming approach implies that all of the benefits over the 
T-period horizon are captured in the first period compensated demand 
function. But of more interest is the fact that the "correct" measure 
of consumer surplus includes an unobserved term, measuring the 
benefits accruing to the consumer from the change in expected utility 
due to a shift in the pdf over future spot prices, given unchanged 
first period prices and consumptions. 
The unobserved term in the CS measure raises some basic 
questions about the welfare implications of a CS measure designed to 
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express the benefits accruing from a project such as a dam-reservoir 
complex, when the effect (in part) of the project is to alter the 
probability distributions of consumers over future spot prices. This 
is related to what is involved in the notion of an ex ante Pareto 
optimum. The idea is this. Ex ante optimality refers to any feasible 
allocation that maximizes the expected utility of one consumer for 
given levels of expected utility for other consumers; alternatively, 
at an ex ante optimum, we can't make one consumer better off in terms 
of expected utility without making some other consumer worse off in 
terms of expected utility. But this is to hold for given subjective 
probability distributions over payoffs. If pdfs change, then any 
resulting allocation is simply non comparable (in the !X ante sense) 
with allocations holding before the change in pdfs. 
The CS measure in (34) measures the benefits to an individual 
resulting from a parameter change that alters his subjective pdf over 
future price vectors. While the CS measure in (34) is the measure 
relevant for decision making wish respect to a proposed dam-reservoir 
project, it is irrelevant to policy decisions linked to !X ante 
optimality or to the attainment of � ante Pareto superior 
allocations, because of the effect of the dam-reservoir project on the 
pdf's of consumers. 
What is needed in the case of the spot market economy is a 
different notion of a Pareto ranking, one defined over vectors 
(f1, • .
• 
,fI) of subjective pdfs. In this ranking, one vector is Pareto 
superior to another if the vector of expected utilities (EU1, 
•
•
• 
,EUI) 
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associated with the first vector of pdf's is weakly larger (component 
by component) than the vector of expected utilities associated with 
the second vector of pdf's. A Pareto optimum is achieved with a 
feasible vector of pdf's if no other feasible vector of pdf's is 
Pareto superior to it. This is a completely different kind of Pareto 
ranking than the � ante ranking, and presumably it is this difference 
that in part at least accounts for the quite different specifications 
of CS as between (8) and (34), including the unobserved component in 
(34). 
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